

---

# *Southern Politics* Revisited: On V. O. Key's "South in the House"

**David A. Bateman**, *Cornell University*

**Ira Katznelson**, *Columbia University*

**John Lapinski**, *University of Pennsylvania*

*V. O. Key's Southern Politics in State and Nation continues to be a central text in political science, the single most important work in understanding the role of the South in American politics. This article returns to, replicates, and seeks to advance Key's analysis of southern politics in Congress, reanalyzing and extending his account of southern strategies and actions in the House of Representatives. Where Key's text was characterized by an episodic attention to issue substance, we focus directly on how southern representation varied across discrete issue areas. We generate temporally fine-grained issue-specific ideal points for members of Congress that allow us to determine how congressional preferences changed across time, generating a more refined portrait of the process by which southern Democratic members diverged from their northern counterparts. We also thicken and extend Key's account along regional and temporal dimensions, assessing how his findings change when we employ a legal-institutional definition of the South, and include the whole period from the beginning of the New Deal to the close of the Truman administration. The article concludes by detailing the significance of our finding to the study of American politics, particularly American political development.*

V. O. Key's magisterial *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, a chronicle of "the attempt to keep an illiberal social institution embedded in a putatively democratic polity" rightly has been considered "one of the great achievements of our discipline."<sup>1</sup> Some six and a half decades after its appearance, it has yet to be equaled within political science as a rigorous and sustained intervention in public affairs. Its combination of provenance, purposes, and audiences distinguish it from even the best books of political science. Moreover, it can be read both as a primary historical source, a chronicle by a southern liberal of the political dynamics of Jim Crow just a half-decade before the unanticipated *Brown v. Board* decision, and as a mixed-methods model of how to conduct meaningful research on key themes in American political development. *Southern Politics* must also be the only major political science study to have been undertaken at the explicit encouragement of the director of the Bureau of the Budget and the president of the United States, both of whom wrote to Key. "The President," recalled Key's collaborator Alexander Heard, wrote to say he "understood Key had an opportunity to serve the nation by studying the

politics of the South, and that he (Truman) hoped that he (Key) would undertake it."<sup>2</sup>

It should be said at once that although its focus is on the racial dynamics of southern politics, this is a book nearly exclusively about the white South. The product of a large research enterprise funded by a \$40,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, the study was originated to examine the electoral process, with a special emphasis on the poll tax by the political scientist, Roscoe Martin, who directed the University of Alabama's Bureau of Public Administration, who recruited Key, then at Johns Hopkins. Unlike the other great 1940s research enterprise on race in America, Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*, the vast southern landscape that came into view in *Southern Politics* is marked by particular

2. Alexander Heard, "The Making of Southern Politics," *Perspectives on the American South: An Annual Review of Society, Politics, and Culture*, ed. Merle Black and John Shelton Reed (New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1984), 6. The president had been notified by Governor Ellis Arnall of Georgia, and in his letter to Key expressed his "opinion that the project is an important one, and [his] hope that you will find it possible to undertake this assignment." Alexander P. Lamis, "Southern Politics at the Time of V.O. Key," *The Oxford Handbook of Southern Politics*, ed. Charles S. Bullock III and Mark J. Rozell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 31. Shortly after receipt of the president's letter, Key wrote to Roscoe Martin, saying "I suppose I'll be hearing from the Pope next." Heard, "Making of Southern Politics," 6.

1. John H. Aldrich, "Southern Parties in State and Nation," *Journal of Politics* 62 (2000): 644, 643.

absences.<sup>3</sup> Most notable are the voices of black southerners, perhaps a reflection of the all-white research team. W. M. Brewer, a reviewer for the *Journal of Negro History*, wryly noted how “the exploration resembles that of Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma* without, of course, any such able colored participants as Dr. Ralph Bunche who would have been indispensable for reporting the realities regarding Negroes.” Strikingly, too, there is no mention of Myrdal’s work by Key, though surely he knew its content thoroughly. Writing in the *American Political Science Review*, Arthur Holcombe observed that “there is method in this neglect.”<sup>4</sup>

Indeed there was. Key’s text was narrower than Myrdal’s synoptic overview, within which, by contrast, politics played a relatively modest role. In centering attention on the strategic role and patterns of action within white-initiated and white-governed political institutions, most notably the region’s anomalous electoral system, Key wished to reveal its implications for policy and political representation. A Texas-born southerner who had been trained in political science at the University of Chicago during the early period of the behavioral revolution, Key sought to disclose the systematic roots and expose the baneful consequences of the South’s race-obsessed political arrangements. He revealed mechanisms that gave every advantage to the region’s semi-modern plantation aspects, especially its black-belt counties, “the hard core of the political South,” where whites often were, or approached being, a demographic minority.<sup>5</sup> He wanted, most of all, to empower what he called “the unknown political South,” whose range included progressivism and populism, and a preference for urban and industrial modernization, as well as tendencies that were not obsessed with racial hierarchy.

In all, Key aimed to shape a discussion that would empower sympathetic southern moderates much like himself who yearned for steady if slow reform without external—that is, federal—intervention that might engender fierce white resistance. His hope and hedged prediction was that the growth of cities, the relative decline of agriculture, and the out-migration of blacks would prove to be “underlying trends that probably will in due course further free [the South] from the effects of the Negro on its

politics,” thus making southern politics more like that of the rest of the nation.<sup>6</sup>

Most historically minded Americanists know the central features of Key’s analysis of what he labeled the “unfathomable maze” of political structures in the Jim Crow South.<sup>7</sup> “The presence of the Negro,” he wrote, “has created the conditions under which the political process operates.”<sup>8</sup> Southern politics based on a white regional consensus about racial supremacy was organized in a plethora of factional patterns under the umbrella of what he designated a nonparty system. Unguided by strong and competitive political parties, the character of the segregationist politics chronicled by Key varied from state to state, taking one of four principal forms: battles between a hegemonic machine and its opponents; battles between geographic areas; battles among competing colorful and often demagogic leaders; and completely unstructured patterns.

These patterns all operated as arrangements of minority rule, directed by leaders selected in Democratic Party primaries by small to moderate-sized, overwhelmingly or exclusively, white electorates. Overall, this patterning of political participation and competition was not equivalent to standard practices, but was characterized by Key as “no party at all.”<sup>9</sup> The nonmajoritarian rules of the game were organized above all to underpin the region’s deepest and most intensely held racial commitments. It was, as a leading student of political parties has put the point, “the maintenance of an illiberal society—the withholding of the rights of citizenship from a sufficiently large number to assure minority elections in a putatively majority system—that was the goal” of what Key called one-party factionalism.<sup>10</sup>

*Southern Politics* sought to unpack the mechanisms, processes, procedures, and consequences of this peculiar, semi-organized, and heterogeneous pattern of politics. But Key went beyond cataloguing the region’s peculiar political diversity. While southern politics and its “nonparty” system was the great exception to ordinary two-party competitive politics in American life, the South was an integral—indeed, a powerful—actor within national politics, especially Congress. There, the white South, a community of shared fate and intention, acted to guard the region’s autonomous capacity to regulate its system of racial hierarchy and humiliation. That responsibility demanded cohesion despite divisions of style, political practice, and ideology. “The one-party system of the South,” Key famously observed, “is an institution with an odd dual personality. In state politics the Democratic party is no party at all but a

3. Gunnar Myrdal, with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1944). For an examination of *Southern Politics*’ absences, see the contributions in Angie Maxwell and Todd G. Shields, *Unlocking V.O. Key Jr.: Southern Politics for the Twenty-First Century* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2011).

4. Arthur N. Holcombe, “Review of *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, by V.O. Key, Jr.,” *American Political Science Review*, 44(1950): 192.

5. Valdimir Orlando Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), 666.

6. Key, *Southern Politics*, 671–72.

7. Key, *Southern Politics*, 664.

8. Key, *Southern Politics*, 671.

9. Key, *Southern Politics*, 392, 387.

10. Aldrich, “Southern Parties,” 662.

multiplicity of factions struggling for office. In national politics, on the contrary, the party is the Solid South; it is, or at least has been, the instrument for the conduct of ‘foreign relations’ of the South with the rest of the nation.” Further, he argued, “the maintenance of southern Democratic solidarity has depended fundamentally on a willingness to subordinate to the race question all great social and economic issues that tend to divide people into opposing parties.” Race, and only race, provided “the foundation of southern unity in national politics.”<sup>11</sup>

In our reading, the enduring importance of *Southern Politics* lies primarily neither in its rich considerations of politics in the eleven states of the Old Confederacy, which amount to a time-bound snapshot based on more than five hundred interviews by the project’s staff, nor in the detailed account it offers of how voting rights had been restricted by a wide array of laws and practices, both constituting hundreds of pages. Analytically and substantively, the book’s comparatively concise chapters that deal with national political representation, composing fewer than 40 of the book’s 675 pages, are of vital importance. These chapters constitute the text’s central contribution to understanding why the peculiar politics of the South mattered not just for its residents, white and black, but for the country as a whole.<sup>12</sup>

Thus it is primarily in “Solidarity in the Senate” and “The South in the House” that Key redeems the “in the nation” promise of the book’s subtitle. These chapters demonstrate how the South was not merely one region among many, or simply an important component of the Democratic Party. The individuality of the country’s most distinctive section shaped the preferences and powers of its representatives, sharply delineated how they would act across a range of policy arenas, and constrained how congressional coalitions could form. The congressional chapters elucidate the mechanisms by which southern diversity was transformed in Washington into the “Solid South,” and show how the absence of meaningful political parties and party competition came to be transmuted into a cohesive single quasi-party of regional representatives who defended the South’s capacity to regulate segregation and restrict voting without federal regulation and control.

The diversity of southern interests, Key hypothesized, did not disappear in the legislature. Rather, the full range of interests and preferences was tamed, limited, and ordered by the paramount preference of southerners—as individual members, as constituency representatives, and as members of the Democratic Party—to defend the contours of the section’s racial rules. In converting multiplicity to

singularity when its representatives converged on Washington and guarded against what they perceived as external intrusion, the region became a “southern nation” within congressional debates and lawmaking.

Southerners gauged policies, Key argued, not only by common standards of party agendas, ideology, personal predilections, or constituency interests, but first and foremost by how they perceived implications for the racial order, which became constitutive of each of these other factors. These assessments guided which issue coalitions they were prepared to enter, and influenced when they united and when they divided in the face of cross-pressures, especially those that placed the majoritarian interests of their party in tension with their regional preferences. And these assessments had to be made on a recurring basis, charged by varying levels of anxiety. If substance matters, Key understood, it matters not in general, but inside historical time.

This article returns to, replicates, and seeks to advance Key’s analysis at the institutional site—Congress—where the region’s political diversity was wrought into an anvil of sectional unity. Our main goal is to press forward with Key’s findings and hunches about sectionalism in Congress by staying close to how he worked, yet by extending the scope of his scholarship and the techniques he employed. Most simply, Key—like all of us—was limited by the available technology and measures. The effort involved in amassing roll calls and calculating summary quantities of legislator behavior was considerable, and rather than a comprehensive account of congressional voting in the period, Key made the reasonable choice to subset the data and reduce the task to manageable proportions. Accordingly, as a first step, we thicken Key’s data. Heroically (before computers!), he analyzed 598 roll calls in seven Senate sessions (1933, 1935, 1937, 1939, 1941, 1943, and 1945) and 275 roll calls in four House sessions (1933, 1937, 1941, and 1945). We replicate his calculations for the House by utilizing the full set of roll calls for the period Key assessed, reproducing the questions and methods he deployed, but with fuller information.<sup>13</sup>

Key’s empirical analysis, as with other reexaminations of this period, relies heavily on Rice cohesion scores and related measures of roll call voting.<sup>14</sup>

13. There are a number of reasons to limit the analysis to the House. Space limitations mean that an analysis that incorporated both the House and the Senate would be unlikely to go beyond a bare replication of Key. As discussed above, our goal is not simply to replicate Key but to anticipate what he would have done had he had a policy coding scheme and ideal point estimation techniques available. The methodological motivation is that the greater number of House members relative to the Senate allows for greater analytical leverage and enables us to better explore differences between southern members.

14. Ira Katznelson and Quinn Mulroy, “Was the South Pivotal? Situated Partisanship and Policy Coalitions during the New Deal and Fair Deal,” *Journal of Politics* 74 (2012): 604–20.

11. Key, *Southern Politics*, 315–16.

12. By contrast, a recent collection of essays on “Southern Politics for the Twenty-First Century” pays scant attention to the two chapters on Congress. Maxwell and Shields, *Unlocking V. O. Key, Jr.*

While these measures do convey important information about patterns of voting, they have been criticized as uninterpretable as measures of preference homogeneity, which is an animating concern of *Southern Politics*. And while the roll calls he analyzed were organized primarily by degrees of regional solidarity and the stability of party coalitions, Key also suggested that issue substance—including race, but extending well beyond—structured the behavior of representatives. While there is an episodic attention to policy substance in the congressional chapters of *Southern Politics*, there is no systematic analysis of how southern preferences varied across issue areas. What would Key have argued had he been able to systematically categorize roll call votes by their content, as well as estimate members' preferences?

Here we move beyond replicating Key's findings to focus directly on southern preferences and their variation across policies, periods, and geography. Drawing on the multilevel issue categorization first outlined in Katznelson and Lapinski, we examine the policy areas Key identified as invoking a greater or lesser degree of southern solidarity, cross-party coalitions, partisan polarization, and regional isolation.<sup>15</sup> We report cohesion and likeness scores, providing an extension of Key's descriptive analysis of southern voting patterns. But we also generate a set of issue specific and cross-time comparable ideal points that allow us to more directly examine the distribution and variation in southern preferences.

To these replications and extensions of Key's analysis, we make two additional adjustments. First, we enlarge Key's analysis in time by carrying on to the close of the Truman presidency and the 82nd Congress. With this move, we include the full twenty-year period of Democratic presidential rule that, but for the 80th Congress, was characterized by Democratic Party control of the legislature. A central theme of *Southern Politics* was the possibility of southern transformations, and extending the time frame allows us to better identify moments of inflection that presaged the eventual southern realignment.

Second, we broaden the geography of the South beyond the old Confederate states to include six more, treating the South as a distinctive racial order. Key made his selection not on the basis of secession, but on measures of distinctiveness in electoral behavior during presidential elections following Reconstruction. We prefer a legal and institutional standard. The seventeen states mandating racial segregation in schools before the *Brown* decision of 1954 match the fifteen that practiced slavery when the Civil War

began, plus West Virginia and Oklahoma.<sup>16</sup> At the start of 1967, only the same seventeen states still outlawed interracial marriage, on the eve of the *Loving v. Virginia* ruling that such laws are unconstitutional. In identifying the South in terms of its shared and distinctive racial features under the law, we can compare the implications of an extended South to those Key discovered within a more compact region. This extension, of course, introduces a bias against findings of southern cohesion and collective power; the larger the region, the more likely a variety of behavior. But it also facilitates learning when roll call behavior mapped onto this diversity, and when it did not.

With these additions and shifts, we can discern if, how, and with respect to what there was more temporal and substantive variation to southern congressional behavior than Key discovered. By using new measures that directly examine members' preferences across time and across different issue areas, we are able to reground Key's motivating interest in the sources of southern homogeneity and diversity on a foundation especially suited for that task. The development and use of these measures, and the systematic attention to diversity and homogeneity in preferences across issue areas, distinguishes the contribution of this article from the recent literature on the South during this period.<sup>17</sup> We are not solely interested in assessing whether Key's findings stand under new specifications and with additional data. Rather, we believe that further comprehension of the role of

16. While based on legal and institutional measures, the seventeen-state South also has, or at least had, broader cultural significance in the minds of southern representatives. Frank E. Smith, the "Congressman from Mississippi," wrote in 1964 that "race has thus been the major influence in Southern politics for the last hundred years. 'Southern' in this case means more than the former states of the Confederacy—it includes border states like Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Oklahoma, and parts of states like Missouri and New Mexico." Frank E. Smith, *Congressman From Mississippi* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), 111. The Southern Governors' Conference in 2014 is composed of sixteen of the seventeen states we include—the exception being Delaware—as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The *Brown v. Board of Education* decision originated in Kansas, which was one of four states that allowed but did not require racial segregation in schools. The constitution of Wyoming prohibited distinction on the basis of race in public schools, although a statute had authorized local authorities to do so when there were more than fifteen black students. This option does not seem to have ever been employed. Arizona required segregated schools until 1951, while in New Mexico and Kansas school segregation was decided at the local level. Arthur E. Sutherland, "Segregation by Race in Public Schools, Retrospect and Prospect," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 20 (1955): 169–83; Charles T. Clotfelter, *After "Brown": The Rise and Retreat of School Desegregation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 18.

17. Sean Farhang and Ira Katznelson, "The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal," *Studies in American Political Development* 19 (2005): 1–30; Devin Caughey and Eric Schickler, "Public Opinion, Organized Labor, and the Limits of New Deal Liberalism, 1936–1945," *Studies in American Political Development* 25 (2011): 162–89; Katznelson and Mulroy, "Was the South Pivotal?"

15. Ira Katznelson and John S. Lapinski, "The Substance of Representation: Studying Policy Content and Legislative Behavior," in *The Macropolitics of Congress*, ed. E. Scott Adler and John S. Lapinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 96–126.

the South in Congress is both essential for understanding the development of the American state and a necessary condition for the success of the historical turn among congressional scholars.<sup>18</sup>

To preview our findings, we identify vital break-points in congressional behavior across different policy domains, locating the origins of the process by which southern representatives began distancing themselves from the core of the Democratic Party. When examined in the aggregate, the key moment comes with the attack on Pearl Harbor. When we probe member preferences at a closer level, across specific issue areas, we find that changing southern preferences were not primarily occupied with the conduct of the war or America's relations abroad. Rather the appearance of an aggregate southern movement away from the Democratic Party built on an earlier move toward the Right on domestic policy, in particular on issues relating to political economy and labor markets. This too has a relatively clear point of origin, first becoming evident in 1935, ratcheting up in 1937, in 1942, and again after the war. This divergence occurred for both a restricted eleven-state South as well as for the representatives of the six other southern states. But it persisted and grew more important over time for the former and not the latter, as what had been a coherent regional grouping became less so. Moreover, the region's fracturing occurred on precisely those issues where the threat posed by federal programs to the racial order were perceived as being the greatest. On these issues, the potential benefits of federal intervention came to be increasingly outweighed by the threat to white supremacy, at least for representatives of the Black Belt and the eleven-state South. While still largely supportive of white supremacy, representatives of the broader region were also more willing to support the activist agenda of their nonsouthern copartisans. The consequence of southern preference change was that by the end of the period examined here, southern Democrats were disproportionately in the median position in the House across a range of issue areas, and likely had an effective veto on organizing the country's political economy.

We proceed as follows. The initial section replicates Key's principal findings, extended to include more congresses and a more expansive definition of the South. It is the second and third sections, however, that constitute the empirical core of this paper. The second section builds on Key's identification of specific issue areas in which there were important regionally based divergences from straight party voting. We here introduce and employ a set of temporally

18. Ira Katznelson, "Historical Approaches to the Study of Congress: Toward a Congressional Vantage on American Political Development," in *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, ed. Eric Schickler and Frances E. Lee (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 115–37.

comparable issue-specific ideal point scores that allow us to identify the moments and issues when southern preferences began to diverge from their copartisans. The third section looks more closely at the impact of the changes in southern preferences from the 73rd to 81st congresses, disaggregating these by racial geography and assessing the likelihood that southerners occupied the pivotal locations across different issue areas. We conclude by discussing the significance of these findings for our understanding of southern politics during this period, as well as the broader importance of the South to American political development.

## I. SOUTHERN POLITICS REVISITED

When *Southern Politics* first appeared, some critics worried about whether Key's roll call data was flawed by reason of selection and method. Might the choice of working exclusively with data generated by behavior during the first, as distinct from the second, session of each Congress bias the results? There is important literature in political science that suggests there are potentially larger first-term effects for lawmaking.<sup>19</sup> We probe the question of whether this move was consequential for Key's work. Party discipline and party voting are likely, it was thought, to be more robust during the periods measured by Key.<sup>20</sup> This concern, we will see, was wide of the mark. But another, the argument that the importance of southern behavior might have been better probed "through the utilization of finer classification," we believe to be on target, and has served as one motivation for the development of the three-level coding of congressional votes discussed below.<sup>21</sup>

Key opened his treatment of the South in Congress by identifying the degree to which southerners constituted a voting bloc whose cohesion was similar to the level achieved by nonsouthern Democratic and Republican members. In doing so, he chased a paradox. Could it be the case that the disorganized, factional politics of the region nonetheless could produce an organized and unified assemblage of representatives? Discovering that they were, in fact, equivalently united, he was empowered to turn to his central substantive question. If southern members did, indeed, form a comparably cohesive voting group, what were the issues that united them? He was particularly interested in discerning whether a

19. David Mayhew, *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking and Investigations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991); Gregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler, *Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 37.

20. Jay Topkis, "Review of *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, by V.O. Key, Jr.," *Yale Law Journal* 59 (1950): 1203–6.

21. Cortez A. Ewing, "Review of *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, by V.O. Key, Jr.," *Journal of Politics* 12 (1950): 155.

Republican and southern Democratic “conservative coalition” was in fact showing signs of emergence.

Key relied on a variety of measures, notably Rice cohesion scores and a variant of party unity scores. As Keith Krehbiel has shown, these measures, along with many other commonly used indices of legislative behavior, are arbitrarily sensitive to the agenda.<sup>22</sup> The scores can change dramatically as a result of change in what is being voted on, even if member preferences are held fixed. Cohesion scores, for instance, can be low when a bloc of legislators’ preferences are very similar but a proposal is such that it will divide this bloc, and can be high despite considerable diversity of preferences if a proposal is sufficiently extreme.<sup>23</sup> They are simply a summary of how often a given bloc voted together and do not anchor voting patterns in information about individual-level preferences or the relative location of policy proposals. As a result, they do not reveal the sources of cohesion, which may include the character of the agenda of the moment, party pressures, constituency characteristics and interests, and the personal predilections of representatives.

For these reasons, we turn to a set of preference-based measures in Section II. But cohesion and other scores can nonetheless convey important information about variation and changes in patterns of legislative voting. Systematic changes in these scores reflect either shifts in the agenda, in individual preferences, or in other factors such as caucus organization. As Key and many others have shown, used carefully and as invitations to further probes, such scores can be very revealing of when and on which issues such changes are occurring.

Key found that during the four House sessions he examined, southern Democrats scored highest, at a level of 70, a performance that compared with a

22. A cohesion score is calculated as the absolute difference between the number of members of a defined group who favor or oppose a given roll call, divided by the number of voting members of this group. The cohesion scores reported by Key, and by us, are averaged across relevant groups of roll calls. Cohesion and likeness scores were pioneered by Stuart Rice and have been deployed widely since. See Stuart Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1928). For the most pertinent critiques, see Keith Krehbiel, “Where’s the Party?,” *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (1993): 235–66; and Krehbiel, “Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship,” *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2000): 212–27. The concerns raised by Scott Desposato, that cohesion scores are biased for small groups, should not apply here, as there was always a sizeable contingent of southern Democrats, Republicans, and nonsouthern Democrats. Scott Desposato, “Correcting for Small Group Inflation of Roll-Call Cohesion Scores,” *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (2005): 731–44.

23. If the cut-line for a bill—the halfway point between the status quo and the policy proposal on an array of policy preferences—falls right in the middle of a bloc, it is likely that a low cohesion score will result, while a cut-line that appears on an extreme point distant from this bloc will likely result in a high cohesion score. This is true whether the bloc has strongly similar or widely diverse preferences.

Republican 66, and an even lower overall Democratic Party cohesion score of 59. Our replication, reported in the top section of Table 1, shows Key to have been uncannily accurate regarding the sessions he analyzed, and also puts to rest the idea that Key’s data was compromised by a first-session bias.<sup>24</sup> Cohesion measured across all roll calls in the four congresses assayed by Key produces results nearly identical to those measured across only the first sessions. The addition of the three congresses in Key’s time frame that he did not examine likewise does not substantially change his reported results. Cohesion measured across all roll calls in the four congresses assayed by Key produces results nearly identical to those measured across only the first sessions. By contrast, the temporal extension to the end of the Truman administration reveals a clear sign of change, as cohesion for the full seventeen-state South drops from approximately 65 to 57, from 68 to 62 for the Republicans, and increases dramatically from 65 to 79 for nonsouthern Democrats.

Wanting to gauge regional and partisan cohesiveness from another perspective, Key calculated the percentage of votes in which southerners achieved cohesion scores of 70 and above. The bottom section of Table 1 reports our replication for the four sessions he analyzed; in addition, we offer results for a seventeen-state South. Key established that the southern bloc was the most persistently cohesive, voting above the high level above 70 more than 60 percent of the time. By contrast, Republicans did so on just 54 percent of the votes in the House, nonsouthern Democrats on 48 percent, and the Democratic Party as a whole on just 44 percent. A more complex pattern, though, comes into view when we extend the South to seventeen states. Although southerners, counted this way, continued to rank first in cohesiveness, the frequency of their high cohesion votes drops to 54 percent from 62, thus indicating intraregional heterogeneity that presses us to identify and distinguish issues on which high southern cohesion was maintained from those where it was not. Again, the temporal extension to the end of the 82nd Congress shows the clearest indication of changing voting patterns, as the percent of roll calls with high southern cohesion drops from 52 for the 73–79th to 40 for the 80–82nd congresses. Republicans show a similarly stark decline, while again the nonsouthern Democrats became more cohesive in their voting.

The basic patterns that we find of an initially high southern cohesion declining over time is summarized in Figure 1, which disaggregates cohesion scores by congressional session for both an eleven-state and seventeen-state South. The 1932–52 period is

24. The slight differences between our scores and Key’s are likely the result of our coding members as having voted for or against a measure if they were paired, and different assessments of whether a vote was procedural.

Table 1. Replication and Spatial and Temporal Extensions

REPLICATION AND EXTENSION: AVERAGE COHESION SCORES (P. 370)					
	Key (1)	Replication (2)	All Sessions (3)	73rd to 79th (4)	80th to 82nd (5)
Southern Democrats (11 states)	70.4	70.3	68.1	67.5	60.0
Nonsouthern Democrats (37 states)	61.7	62.9	62.8	62.6	75.5
Southern Democrats (17 states)	n/a	67.7	65.3	64.8	56.8
Nonsouthern Democrats (31 states)	n/a	65.2	65.1	65.2	79.7
Democrats	58.5	59.1	56.9	57.8	55.3
Republicans	66.0	67.3	67.2	68.0	62.3
<i>Roll Calls</i>	275	274	553	1,062	474

REPLICATION AND EXTENSION: PERCENT OF ROLL CALLS WITH COHESION SCORES ABOVE 70 (P. 370)					
	Key (1)	Replication (2)	All Sessions (3)	73rd to 79th (4)	80th to 82nd (5)
Southern Democrats (11 states)	60.4%	61.7%	59.4%	57.8%	46.2%
Nonsouthern Democrats (37 states)	48.4%	49.6%	49.7%	49.1%	67.9%
Southern Democrats (17 states)	n/a	54.4%	52.4%	52.1%	40.1%
Nonsouthern Democrats (31 states)	n/a	52.9%	52.8%	53.7%	76.4%
Democrats	43.6%	44.5%	40.7%	42.3%	38.8%
Republicans	53.8%	56.6%	54.4%	56.7%	46.2%
<i>Roll Calls</i>	275	274	553	1,062	474

Column (1) reports Key's results, while column (2) reports our replication. Column (3) covers the same congresses as Key (73rd, 75th, 77th, and 79th), but includes votes across all sessions. Column (4) includes all votes in the 73–79th period, while column (5) examines all votes in the 80–82nd congresses. Roll calls with fewer than 10 percent of voting members in dissent are excluded, as are procedural votes.

highlighted, but also placed in a longer historical perspective to underscore the degree to which the changes in voting that emerged in the period were of lasting significance. When viewed this way, a significant point of inflection leaps out. Measured absolutely and relatively, southern solidarity proved higher

during the first New Deal Congress than at any later point during the Roosevelt and Truman presidencies, with the exception of the short second session of the 76th Congress in November 1939 when Congress voted on measures authorizing the president to restrict arms sales and enforce neutrality in response




Fig. 1. Cohesion Scores in the House of Representatives, 1921–1965.

to the outbreak of war in Europe. From the start of the New Deal through to 1943 and the 77th Congress, the last considered by Key, southern members voted alike more often than nonsouthern Democrats and on par with the much reduced Republican faction.

But a critical change set in just afterward, a difference Key's temporal span made it difficult to observe. Starting in the 78th Congress, an increasingly wide gap opened up between southern Democrats, who grew *less* cohesive, and nonsouthern Democrats, whose voting became *more* solid. These striking trends were similar both for an eleven-state and seventeen-state South, and continued well into the 1960s.

Key, of course, was interested in more than how southern cohesion compared to other partisan and regional groupings in the legislature. Above all, he wanted to identify when, and the extent to which, southerners opposed, or were opposed by, other coalitions. In Table 2 we replicate Key's report on the number of roll calls where a majority of southern Democrats opposed a majority of Republicans (columns 1–3).<sup>25</sup> Looking only at Key's four congresses during the first session, a large proportion of votes did pit southern Democrats against Republicans, a finding that endures when the region is expanded to the full South (columns 7–8).

Consider, once again, the dramatic changes in roll call behavior that Key's data set could not distinguish. Table 2, column (11) highlights how opposition to Republicans from Democrats in the seventeen-state South was initially impressive, starting at 83 percent of roll calls. This level of disagreement remained high through the 76th Congress. With the 77th Congress at the start of World War II, however, this pattern began to alter, and the fraction of roll calls on which southerners voted against Republicans became much smaller, hitting a low of 47 percent in the 82nd Congress, never to return to the sharply polarized situation that had prevailed.

Wishing to evaluate the extent of disagreement between the southern Democrats and Republicans, Key also calculated the percentage of votes when at least 90 percent of southern Democrats voted together against a majority of Republicans; that is, votes on policies in which the South both was most cohesive and most likely to have had intense preferences. We replicate and extend his results in Table 3. With a relatively small N and a short time period being assessed, it is not surprising that Key found a significant degree of variation among the sessions he analyzed: a rate of about 32 percent in the 75th and 79th, and hovering at 50 percent and just above in the 73rd and 77th (column 3 of Table 3). He also established that even on these votes of intense disagreement with

25. These scores are effectively equivalent to party unity scores, in that they are counts of the number of votes on which a majority of one faction voted against a majority of another.

Republicans, southerners, who in the 73rd always voted with their fellow Democrats, started to oppose nonsouthern Democratic majorities in a small but not trivial number of roll calls in the other three congresses. The replication in columns (6–7) of Table 3 is based on many more votes, but the pattern largely remains as Key described it. There was a decreasing proportion of votes on which a cohesive South, either the former Confederacy or the full region, voted in opposition to Republicans; and of these, a greater number were in opposition to both Republicans and nonsouthern Democrats (columns 7 and 9).

An alternative way to map potential coalitional dynamics is through the use of Rice's likeness scores.<sup>26</sup> Likeness scores have similar limits to cohesion scores and should not be interpreted as measures of preference convergence.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, because they score similarity only by calculating whether two blocs voted alike on a given measure or set of measures and do not integrate information about how other blocs voted, the scores for specific factional dyads should not be looked at in isolation from the scores for other pairings.<sup>28</sup> But as with cohesion scores, change in the scores over time or across issues points to potentially important developments, either in the location of the policies being voted on or in the preferences of the legislators.

Treating Congress as a Republican, nonsouthern Democratic, and southern Democratic three-actor environment, Figure 2 traces cross-bloc likeness scores for each Congress, highlighting the New Deal to Fair Deal period, but again placing this in a longer historical context. As with measures of intrabloc cohesion, we see broadly common Democratic Party voting across regions in the early part of the New Deal.<sup>29</sup> In

26. These are calculated by the equation:  $100 - | \% \text{Yes bloc 1} - \% \text{Yes bloc 2} |$

27. Krehbiel, "Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship"; Herbert Weisberg, "Alternative Baseline Models and Their Implications for Understanding Coalition Behavior in Congress," *Journal of Politics* 45 (1983): 657–71; William Shade, Stanley Hopper, David Jacobson, and Stephen Moiles, "Partisanship in the United States Senate: 1869–1901," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 4 (1973); Thomas Hammond and Jane M. Fraser, "What Role Calls Should We Exclude from Conservative Coalition Calculations?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 7 (1982): 423–34.

28. If southern Democrats and Republicans have a likeness score of 80 for a series of votes, one might interpret that as implying a high degree of similarity between the two blocs. But if the likeness score for southern Democrats and northern Democrats is 100, then what in fact occurred was that the three blocs all voted nearly unanimously.

29. Variations of these graphs were made that also looked at the likeness between northern and southern Republicans, and southern Republicans and southern Democrats. With some exceptions, southern Republicans were all located in the seventeen-state rather than the eleven-state South. The intraparty likeness scores were consistently high, while the intraregional cross-party scores closely mapped on to that of the southern Democrats and the northern GOP. Accordingly, we limit the attention paid here to southern Republicans. While southern Republicans of the period merit much more attention than the dismissiveness with which

**Table 2. Replication: Roll Calls with Majority of Southern Democrats Opposing Majority of Republicans (p. 371)**

Congress (Year)	Key			Replication: South 11			Extension: South 17		Extension: South 17, all sessions		
	(1) <i>Total</i>	(2) Number	(3) Percent	(4) <i>Total</i>	(5) Number	(6) Percent	(7) Number	(8) Percent	(9) <i>Total</i>	(10) Number	(11) Percent
73 (1933)	56	47	83.9%	57	47	83.9%	46	82.1%	129	107	82.9%
74 (1935)	—	—	—	115	73	63.5%	82	71.3%	184	128	69.6%
75 (1937)	77	50	64.9%	77	53	68.8%	53	68.8%	142	106	74.6%
76 (1939)	—	—	—	76	58	76.3%	60	78.9%	199	148	74.4%
77 (1941)	67	50	74.6%	67	49	73.1%	45	67.2%	117	68	58.1%
78 (1943)	—	—	—	74	45	60.8%	39	52.7%	126	62	49.2%
79 (1945)	75	47	62.7%	74	50	67.6%	44	59.5%	165	80	48.5%
80 (1947)	—	—	—	65	35	53.8%	33	50.8%	126	61	48.4%
81 (1949)	—	—	—	91	45	49.5%	42	46.2%	202	104	51.5%
82 (1951)	—	—	—	88	47	53.4%	44	50%	146	69	47.3%
All	275	194	70.5%	783	502	64.1%	488	62.3%	1536	933	60.7%

Key's scores use the first session of the 73rd, 75th, 77th, and 79th congresses. Key's analysis for the 73–82nd congresses are replicated in columns (4–6). Columns (7–8) extend the analysis to the seventeen-state South, and to all sessions (9–10). Roll calls with fewer than 10 percent of voting members in dissent are excluded, as are procedural votes.

the 74th Congress (1935), southern and nonsouthern Democrats voted together with likeness scores as high as 89 and 92, respectively, for the Confederate eleven states and the Jim Crow seventeen (only the latter shown). Over the course of the two decades we examine, the Democratic Party exhibited more likeness despite regional variations than any other combination of members, but the gap between internal southern and nonsouthern similarity within the Democratic Party and the degree of likeness joining southern Democrats to Republicans narrowed very considerably.

Figure 3 shows the same scores, but separates out the eleven-state South examined by Key and the six additional states that comprise the broader region. A few trends and moments of inflection are evident. Representatives in the eleven-state South had historically been very similar in their voting to the Democratic representatives of West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, Oklahoma, and Delaware. This declined in the first part of the period examined here, but then dropped considerably in 1949, from a score of 87 to 75, about where it would stay for the next few decades. Nor were the representatives of the six southern states outside the Confederacy more similar to the GOP. In fact, their respective likeness scores with the GOP closely track each other until the late New Deal, at which point they diverge. Both the eleven-state South and the six states of the

they were treated by Key, for space reasons we leave that analysis to a future date.

broader region became more like the Republican Party in their voting in 1941, but for the eleven-state South this continued to increase thereafter, while it fluctuated close to its historic levels for the representatives from the remaining six states.

The above extensions invert Key's findings about relative cohesion, while allowing us to better pinpoint the likely temporal and geographic origins of the "conservative coalition" whose emergence was of particular interest to him. In so doing, these findings raise questions of considerable consequence about the substantive issues and concerns that led, simultaneously, to a diminishing southern cohesion and to an increasing nonsouthern Democratic Party unity, as well as to an increasing similarity between southerners and Republicans concentrated among a particular segment of the region.

The above replications should assuage any concerns about potential bias resulting from Key's subset of roll calls, while the temporal and geographic extensions generate additional questions about the content that underpinned the formation of congressional coalitions during the New Deal and Fair Deal. To pursue these questions, however, requires us to move beyond Key's original analysis, and in particular to turn to preference-based measures that allow us to better identify whether the changes we have seen so far were the result of changing southern policy preferences. But we proceed as we imagine Key would have, by employing measures suited to the problems of determining those issues on which southern preferences were most distinctive, and of locating the moments and issues on which the region began its historic shift.

**Table 3. Replication: Roll Calls with High Southern Democratic Cohesion (+90) in Opposition to Republican Majorities (p. 372)**

	Key					South 11		South 17	
	Total	Number	Percent	RCs where SDs agreed with N. Dem. majority	RCs where SDs disagreed with N. Dem. majority	Percent	Percent of which S. Dems vote against N. Dems	Percent	Percent of which S. Dems vote against N. Dems
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
73 (1933)	56	28	50.0%	28	0	41.1%	1.9%	37.2%	0%
74 (1935)	—	—	—	—	—	25.0%	2.2%	24.5%	0%
75 (1937)	77	25	32.5%	20	5	21.8%	12.9%	15.5%	4.5%
76 (1939)	—	—	—	—	—	30.2%	5.0%	36.6%	1.9%
77 (1941)	67	35	52.2%	32	3	29.9%	11.4%	23.1%	0%
78 (1943)	—	—	—	—	—	16.7%	14.3%	12.7%	6.3%
79 (1945)	75	24	32.0%	21	3	18.2%	10.0%	15.2%	4.0%
80 (1947)	—	—	—	—	—	17.5%	4.5%	16.7%	14.3%
81 (1949)	—	—	—	—	—	17.3%	28.6%	11.9%	0%
82 (1951)	—	—	—	—	—	6.8%	10.0%	6.2%	0%
All	275	112	40.7%	101	11	22.3%	9.0%	18.9%	2.4%

Key's scores use the first session of the 73rd, 75th, 77th, and 79th congresses. Columns 6 and 8 shows the percent of roll calls with high southern cohesion in opposition to the majority of Republicans. Columns 7 and 9 shows the percent of these roll calls in which southern Democrats voted against the majority of nonsouthern Democrats. Roll calls with fewer than 10 percent of voting members in dissent are excluded, as are procedural votes. High southern Democratic cohesion is defined as roll calls on which less than 10 percent of southern Democrats deviated from the southern majority.

## II. POLICY CONTENT AND SOUTHERN PREFERENCES

One of the most notable features of the congressional chapters of *Southern Politics* is the role played by policy content. Key approached the substance of roll calls based on the structure of party and of intra- and inter-regional voting patterns in the House and Senate. Working inductively, he sought to identify the subject matter that was at stake for each type of roll call he analyzed, including those in which a majority of southern Democrats opposed a majority of Republicans, and those in which a southern Democratic and Republican coalition was present. He was particularly concerned to understand how and why particular policy issues induced southerners to tap into their most intense preference, what he called the "southern attitude toward the Negro [that] provides the bedrock of southern sectionalism."<sup>30</sup> He also was alert to features that cross-pressured southern representatives. While acutely sensitive to emerging challenges to the racial order, these representatives were Democrats who shared with other party members a keen interest in electoral success and majority status. Additionally, their policy commitments in the main were close to those of fellow Democrats, in keeping

with the core Democratic agenda that was broadly internationalist and, at home, could better deal with the widespread deprivation and poverty that gripped the South.

Despite his interest in the content of roll calls, Key discussed policy substance only with regard to a small number of votes, and his work lacked a template for the classification of policy substance. Without such a categorization, variations in regional and party behavior by the type of policy could not be identified systematically. With the book's restricted time frame, moreover, it was not possible to determine whether voting patterns with regard to a particular policy remained relatively fixed or altered over the course of the era.

The classification scheme we employ is summarized in Table 4.<sup>31</sup> Tier 1 designates four basic elements common to policies in all modern states. The first category is *sovereignty*, the cluster of policies that bear directly on the state as a sovereign entity: the state's indivisible claim to rule legitimately over particular people and places, and thus the very existence, boundaries, and membership of the national

30. Key, *Southern Politics*, 372.

31. For space reasons, the scheme has been reduced to highlight those areas discussed here. For the full scheme, see Katznelson and Lapinski, "The Substance of Representation," 112–13.




Fig. 2. Likeness Scores in the House of Representatives.

regime. The second, *organization and scope*, concerns the substantive reach and range of activities and the institutional elaboration of the national government’s instruments for governing. *International relations* refers to the geopolitical and economic transactions between the United States as a unit in the global system of states and other sovereign states, while *domestic policy* is the category concerned with public policies shaping both the ties between government and the economy and between government and the welfare of its citizens.

These four categories are bulky. At a second tier, these are divided into three or four “blueprint” sub-categories. Thus, sovereignty in a representative democracy always entails decisions about *liberty*,

*membership and nation, civil rights, and physical boundaries*. Organization and scope in such a regime is composed of decisions about *constitutional amendments, government organization, and rules of political representation*. International relations divide into the triad of *defense, geopolitics, and international political economy*, while domestic policy divides into policy judgments about *agriculture and food, planning and resources, political economy, and social policy*.

These distinctions still are not fine grained enough for many analytical purposes. Utilizing a detailed review of congressional committee responsibilities, budget categories, and the classifications of existing coding approaches, each second-tier category is subdivided into two to thirteen tier 3 substantive




Fig. 3. Scores in the House of Representatives, Different Specifications of the South.

Table 4. Policy Classification by Levels, Reduced

Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
Sovereignty	Liberty	Religion Privacy Loyalty and Expression
	Membership and Nation	Commemorations/Nat'l Culture Immigration/Naturalization
	Civil Rights	African Americans Native Americans Other Minority Groups Women Voting Rights
	Boundaries	Frontier Settlement Indian Removal/Compensation State Admission Territories and Colonies
Organization and Scope	Government Organization	Congressional Organization... Executive Organization... Impeachment/Misconduct Judicial Organization...
	Political Representation	Census and Apportionment Elections Groups and Interests
	Constitutional Amendments	Federalism and Terms of Office Political Participation and Rights Other
International Relations	Defense	Air Force Org. and Deployment Army Org. and Deployment Conscription and Enlistment Militias Naval Org. and Deployment General Military Organization Civil and Homeland Defense
	Geopolitics	Diplomacy and Intelligence Foreign Aid International Organizations
	International Political Economy	Maritime Trade and Tariffs Economic International Orgs.
Domestic Policy	Agriculture and Food	Agricultural Technology Farmers and Farming Support Fishing and Livestock
	Planning and Resources	Corporatism Environment Infrastructure and Public Works National Resources Social Knowledge Post Office Wage and Price Controls Interstate Compacts Urban/Regional Development

*Continued*

TABLE 4. *Continued*

Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
	Political Economy	Appropriations Multiple Agency Business and Capital Markets Fiscal and Taxation Labor Markets and Unions Monetary Economic Regulation
	Social Policy	Education Civilian Health Housing Social Insurance Children/Youth Crime Disaster Military Pensions. . . Social Regulation Public Works. . . Transfers, Poverty

classifications intended to be mutually exclusive and comprehensive. Over time, the relative importance of policies at this level of detail varies quite a lot. The coding scheme thus provides policy classifications that can be applied to and combined at different levels of aggregation.

A finding of southern divergence on the tier 2 category of civil rights would hardly be novel. Nor was it the animating theme of Key's analysis. Key was not interested solely in whether southern members diverged from their nonsouthern copartisans on the issue of black rights, but whether the maintenance of white supremacy structured members' positions on a wider range of issues. He repeatedly raised the question of whether "the legislative record would show that southern solidarity contains elements other than a dominant attitude toward the Negro," whether the "regional compulsion toward solidarity spreads out from the race question and induces a higher degree of solidarity on other matters than would otherwise prevail."<sup>32</sup> In pursuing this question, he discovered that on specific policy issues—especially those relating to agriculture, aliens, relief, and labor—the votes of southern members diverged from their nonsouthern copartisans. And he suggested that a combination of an agrarian tilt combined with attitudes toward black Americans structured this behavior.

To push further, we examine the tier 3 issue areas that Key identified as having invoked different patterns of southern solidarity and coalition building. Key identified at least seventy-five distinct and atypical

roll calls in the House and Senate. These included twenty-nine votes in which the South defected from the Democratic Party to vote with Republicans, three votes marked by notably low southern solidarity and twenty-four with especially high cohesion, and eighteen sectional votes in which the South stood alone against nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans.<sup>33</sup> Reclassifying these votes according to the coding scheme outlined above, Key found that southern members were most cohesive on votes about international relations and agriculture, most exceptional on votes about civil rights, and most likely to defect to the Republican position on votes about labor markets and unions. Pursuing this line

33. Of the votes identified by Key, sixteen concerned the tier 1 category of "sovereignty," including two votes on the tier 3 category "immigration," ten on "African American civil rights," and four on "voting rights." Twenty-four concerned the tier 1 category of "international relations," including one on the tier 3 category of "conscription," one on "foreign aid," four on "international organizations," nine on "trade," and an additional nine on "preparation for war," a category likely to fall under "defense," but for which we were not able to find which specific roll calls to which he was referring. Twenty-seven votes concerned the tier 1 category of "domestic policy," including two on the tier 2 categories "agriculture and food," five on "planning and resources," twelve on "political economy"—nine of which were in the tier 3 category of "labor markets and taxation," and seven were on "social policy." An additional six votes concerned quasi-private bills—such as the deportation of Lazar Limonsky, denying federal pay to specific radicals and union leaders on public works, the relief of "sundry aliens," payment of Union Iron Works, and a vote on relocating offices away from the District of Columbia. Key also identified an additional two votes on education, which are coded under this scheme as civil rights for African Americans as they concerned nondiscrimination. See Key, *Southern Politics*, 351–54, 356–59, 371–77.

32. Key, *Southern Politics*, 360, 345.

of inquiry, we have examined whether these patterns hold across the full range of votes in these issue areas.<sup>34</sup>

We subset roll calls by the different tier 1, 2, and 3 issue areas and use these to calculate quantities such as cohesion or likeness scores. Most importantly, we estimate issue-specific ideal points for each member of the House of Representatives using the item-response model model of Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (CJR), allowing us to directly examine the degree to which preference change underlay the trends noted above.<sup>35</sup> We first estimate a single ideal point per member across a predefined set of roll calls, such as every roll call in a given Congress; or a subset of roll calls on a given issue, session of Congress, or across an interval of time, such as a six-month period. For each subset, a unique ideal point is estimated for every member.

But we are also interested in assessing how members' preferences changed across this period. Given that ideal points have no natural metric, we need to adjust these in order for them to be arrayed on the same dimension and made comparable across time. To do so, we rely on the technique developed by Tim Groseclose, Steven Levitt, and David Snyder (GLS) to adjust interest-group scores such as those compiled by Americans for Democratic Action. In contrast to other ideal point techniques such as DW-NOMINATE, which constrains members to a linear trend in their movements, the GLS-technique places a constraint on the aggregate chamber and allows members to move idiosyncratically over time. Crucially, this allows for inflection points in individual members' movement.<sup>36</sup>

34. Key selected a specific subset of votes based on whether they crossed a specified threshold. Instead, we use the votes he analyzed to identify discrete issue areas in which all of the relevant votes are taken into account, and we generate measures that are specific to these issue areas.

35. Joshua D. Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers, "The Statistical Analysis of Legislative Behavior: A Unified Approach," *American Political Science Review* 98 (2004): 355–70; Joshua D. Clinton and Simon Jackman, "To Simulate or NOMINATE," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34 (2009): 593.

36. Specifically, they estimate the model  $y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_t X_i + \varepsilon_{it}$  with  $y_{it}$  being legislator  $i$ 's ideal point at time  $t$ ,  $X_i$  being a mean-preference parameter—initially the mean score for a member over their entire career—and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  being an error term capturing individual change. They generate "shift" and "stretch" parameters for each unique session—a chamber in a given congress, a legislative session, a bloc of time—and use this to adjust all the scores for this session, with the formula  $\hat{y}_{it} = \frac{(y_{it} - \alpha_i)}{\beta_t}$  where  $\hat{y}_{it}$  is the "adjusted" score for member  $i$  at time  $t$ , and  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_t$  are the session specific shift and stretch parameters. The major limitation of the Groseclose and coauthors' technique, however, is that it assumes members' movements are idiosyncratic, and that the mean long-run weighted average of congressional members remains the same. The estimates are comparable across time for each issue area; but while the rank orderings across issue areas are comparable, their specific location or the distance between members is not directly comparable across issue areas. Tim Groseclose,

There is no obvious correct unit of time on which to estimate an ideal point, and most scholars estimate a score for a particular Congress. But there are limitations in doing so, most obviously that it constrains all change to that accompanying elections. Moreover, estimating Congress-level scores can also reduce the available number of roll calls. While this is not usually a problem when estimating scores across all votes, it is a problem when estimating issue-specific scores, as there will often not be a sufficient number of votes held on an issue in a given Congress to effectively discriminate between members. This problem is most acute for the fine-grained tier 2 and tier 3 categories, which are perhaps the more interesting levels of disaggregation.

We deal with both of these problems—the insufficiently fine-grained time periods generated from Congress-level scores and the occasionally insufficient number of roll calls in a given Congress for a given issue area—in the same way, by selecting units of time that will allow us to capture a sufficient number of roll calls while maximizing temporal granularity. We proceed along a few different tracks. We generate aggregate ideal-point scores across all issue areas—equivalent in this regard to the NOMINATE series—by selecting all roll calls within a six-month window. We advance this window one month at a time, so that the first set of scores covers months two to six, the second months two to seven, the third three to eight, and so on, for the entirety of the period. These scores are then adjusted using the GLS technique so that they are all on the same metric. They can be thought of as a moving snapshot centered on the date in the middle of the six-month interval.<sup>37</sup> This allows us to identify more temporally fine-grained changes than we would see in Congress-level or even session-level scores.

For the tier 1 and tier 2 issue-specific scores, in which the number of roll calls is a motivating concern, we adjust the range to a twelve-month or a fifty-roll-call interval in order to ensure a sufficient number of votes distributed across the policy space.<sup>38</sup> For the tier 3 categories, we select a series

Steven D. Levitt, and James M. Snyder, "Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress," *American Political Science Review* 93 (1999): 33–50. See Joshua D. Clinton, Ira Katznelson, and John Lapinski, "Where Measures Meet History: Party Polarization During the New Deal and Fair Deal," in *Governing in a Polarized Age: Elections, Parties, and Representation in America*, ed. Alan Gerber and Eric Schickler (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); John Lapinski, *The Substance of Representation: Congress, American Political Development, and Lawmaking* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

37. For a similar approach see Adam Bonica, "Punctuated Origins of Senate Polarization," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 39(2014): 5–26.

38. We find that moving from 50 to 100 does not significantly change the recovered ideal points, but does decrease the temporal

of adjacent congresses, based on the patterns discerned at the tier 1 and tier 2 levels, merge these together in an aggregated roll call matrix, and estimate a single score for this period.<sup>39</sup> Crucially, the patterns identified from higher-level aggregations guide our decisions about how to manage the trade-off between the need for sufficient roll calls and for scores that are rooted in discrete and relatively fine-grained periods of time. For instance, a single ideal point per member is estimated in the area of labor markets and unions from the 80th to the 82nd Congress, as well as for the period from the 70th to the 73rd Congress. But as we see evidence that an important shift in member preferences at the tier 2 level of political economy occurred sometime in the mid-1930s, we do not estimate a score that would cover the entire period, which would result in voting patterns from after the southern inflection on this issue informing the ideal points for earlier congresses, and vice versa.<sup>40</sup>

granularity. All ideal point techniques suffer from the possibility that the roll calls will not sufficiently discriminate between members, and increasing the number of roll calls is no panacea against this. See Howard Rosenthal and Erik Voeten "Analyzing Roll Calls with Perfect Spatial Voting: France 1946–1958," *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (2004): 620–32. We find that for tier 1 issue areas, there are sufficient roll calls for either a six- or a twelve-month window. For some tier 2 issue areas there are sufficient roll calls for a twelve-month window, but that for all but a few tier 3 issue areas, we need to arbitrarily set a number of roll calls (rather than a temporal interval) to subset. While this increases the ability to discriminate between members, the problem is that it requires merging across many different congresses—several years in which the politics around an issue might change but only a single score will be generated. To compensate for this, we rely on the inflection points identified with cohesion, likeness, and the tier 1 and tier 2 ideal scores to temporally bound the selection. For instance, as we discuss below, we subset the tier 2 "civil rights" roll calls by merging several congresses, but only those after the inflection that seems to have occurred in the 78th Congress. Note also that the scores are calculated for months in which Congress is in session, and so do not constitute an exact calendar year. Where a specific event or set of debates might be responsible for sudden changes in legislative behavior, this can be confirmed by locating the median at the final date rather than at the center. Merging across several years is certainly not a perfect solution, but it is a widespread practice in estimating across time. DW-NOMINATE estimates scores based on a member's entire tenure, as do the state-level scores estimated by Boris Shor, Christopher Berry, and Nolan McCarty, "A Bridge to Somewhere: Mapping State and Congressional Ideology on a Cross-Institutional Common Space," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 35 (2010): 417–48.

39. In this sense they are equivalent to Common Space scores. Keith Poole, "Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales," *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (1998): 954–93.

40. In estimating issue-specific ideal points, we are seemingly going against the finding of Poole and Rosenthal that most of congressional voting can be reduced to a two-dimensional space. Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call Voting* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). We do not see it this way. The two-dimensional model established by Poole and Rosenthal was chosen based on its parsimony in explaining voting across the entirety of American history. In most congresses, they find some gain to estimating additional dimensions, but

We use these estimates to reground central themes in Key's analysis on measures that allow for a direct assessment of how members' preference changed over time: the importance of white supremacy in structuring southern preferences, on civil rights and other issues, and the importance of policy-issue substance more generally in structuring members' behaviors. We first look at the location of party and sectional medians at the aggregate level, using these to identify shifts in southern preferences. We move from these to the tier 1 and tier 2 issue areas encompassing those policy domains Key highlighted as areas in which the unique features of southern politics were most clearly expressed.

Figure 4 traces the location of the median northern Republican, southern Republican (almost exclusively from the six states of the broader region), northern Democrat, and southern Democrat. Each marker is located at the center of a six-month window, and so incorporates information from the immediate future and past. By limiting the temporal window to six months in which Congress was in session, we can better identify break points in time. The temporal inflections we saw in the cohesion and likeness scores are clearly evident in the party medians as well. While some of shifts in the location of the party medians reflect changes in the composition of Congress following elections, others do not.<sup>41</sup> The 77th

that they are not worth including relative to the task of explaining voting in the aggregate. Scholars interested in using preference-based measures to understand how specific issues change over time—acknowledging that these preferences will not be unrelated to the party cleavage that provides most of the structure to the first DW-NOMINATE—are left with few options in DW-NOMINATE. Where these issues generate different ordering of preferences but do not constitute a sizeable portion of the agenda, they will simply appear in the two-dimensional model as an increased rate of error. We propose issue-specific scores not as an intervention in the debate as to the number of dimensions, but because they allow for closer inspection of how given preferences on a given issue change over time. We are also persuaded by the reasons as to why scholars might want to subset roll calls, as we have done here, offered by Keith Poole. One is to "uncover the microstructure of the spatial map," to find those issues that in the short-term might result in distinct shifts in the aggregate location of members. Another is "to uncover what is going on when structural change is occurring." Keith Poole, *Spatial Maps of Parliamentary Voting* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 185. Southern preferences did clearly shift in an important way during this period, which is also the period in which the second dimension becomes clearly relevant in voting patterns, suggesting the possibility of a structural change for southern representatives, if not for the legislature as a whole. Moreover, as we will see when we examine distinct issue areas, the aggregate shift in the southern position was a reflection of the specific shifts that they took on distinct issue areas, and the aggregate spatial map was produced by how these distinctive patterns of shifts and stability occurred at different times. Understanding the micro-foundations of the spatial maps that place the southerners to the right of the nonsouthern Democrats requires closer attention to how preferences potentially varied by issue.

41. The decline in the northern Democratic median reflects the electoral loss of approximately 30 percent of their seats in November 1942, as well as the loss of approximately 40 percent of their




Fig. 4. Location of Party and Regional Median Members, 1932–1952.

Congress sat from January 1941 to December 1942, and during this period the southern Democrats went from the left side of the Democratic distribution—having in fact moved further away from the center than at any time since the New Deal began—to the right side. Closer inspection shows that their abrupt switch occurred in the months following December 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor. In the dying months of the 77th Congress, however, they once again switched locations, as debate over an anti-poll tax measure temporarily united northern Democrats and Republicans.

Key noted throughout *Southern Politics* that the Black Belt was the bedrock of southern cohesion, and the data allow us to directly compare the preferences of Democrats from the Black Belt congressional districts to those from constituencies with very few African Americans. Figure 5 traces the medians of three different blocs of southern Democratic representatives: those from congressional districts where African Americans constituted over 35 percent of the population; those where they were a smaller, usually much smaller proportion; and those from the six states of the broader region. In the early




Fig. 5. Location of Median Members Across Southern Sub-Regions.




Fig. 6. Diversity in Democratic Preferences, Standard Deviations Across Regions.

New Deal, and indeed for nearly the entirety of the period from 1877 to the New Deal (not shown), the median representatives of the different regional specifications of the South were remarkably similar. But the representatives of the six states of the full South began to diverge from their regional copartisans as the 1940s progressed. No such divergence occurred among the eleven-state representatives. What had been a coherent regional unit was, to a certain extent, fracturing.

Preference-based measures such as ideal points also allow us to better assess whether the trends of a declining southern Democratic and increasing northern Democratic cohesion were the result of an increased heterogeneity of preferences, or whether the policies that were being voted on were simply more likely to divide southern representatives. One way to assess this is to look at the standard deviation of southern Democrats' ideal points: the greater the dispersion of southern preferences, the higher the standard deviation. Figure 6 traces the standard deviation for the Black Belt, the non-Black Belt in the Confederacy, and the six states of the full region. The standard deviations of the Democrats in the North and the full South are shown in the background.

Comparing Figure 1 and Figure 6, the limits of cohesion scores in measuring preference homogeneity are apparent. By the ideal-point measures, the northern Democrats became more heterogeneous in their preferences, despite their increasing cohesion, and,

with the exception of the period immediately surrounding World War II, southern Democrats remained consistently more homogenous in their preferences than their northern copartisans. And, insofar as the region's congressional representation was becoming more heterogeneous by the end of the Truman administration, this was largely a function of increasing dispersion among Democrats from the six states, and their increasing separation from the region's congressional delegation.<sup>42</sup>

The cohesion score trends outlined above were less the result of changes to the dispersion of southern preferences than to the *location* of southerners relative to the broader chamber. As they moved away from their traditional position as the left wing of the Democratic Party, southern representatives were increasingly located near the median of the House. If we expect that roll calls are disproportionately intended to appeal to the median voter, then a group's being located near the median will decrease their cohesion score, as each vote will be more likely to divide them.<sup>43</sup> The region's representatives might have been less cohesive, in the sense that they voted together less frequently than before, but this was a function of their being pivotal on a greater range of votes.

The questions that remain, then, are on what issues were they diverging from the Democratic Party, when did these shifts occur, and to what extent and on what

seats in November 1946. But these losses persisted through the 81st and 82nd Congresses, suggesting a transformation in the northern faction of the party during this period.

42. For a similar finding of low southern preference heterogeneity, see Devin Caughey, "Congress, Public Opinion, and Representation in the One-Party South, 1930s–1960s" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2012), 49.

43. As an empirical matter, the roll calls for the period did indeed cluster at the center of the chamber: 74 percent of roll calls saw cut-lines within the two standard deviations surrounding the chamber mean.




Fig. 7a. Location of Party and Regional Median Members, Tier 1 Issue Areas.

issues did this result in the “southern nation” becoming pivotal for the enactment of national policy? The remainder of this article disaggregates these measures by policy and period, situating the observed variation and break points in the context of the politics of the time.

Aggregate scores mask considerable heterogeneity across issues. Figure 7 traces the party and sectional medians across the tier 1 issue areas of *sovereignty*, *organization and scope*, *domestic policy*, and *international relations*. The scores are calculated for a twelve-month window and advance one month at a time. Striking differences appear, even at the coding classification’s bulkier first tier of analysis, in both the extent and timing of southern preference change. Southern members did not simply become more conservative across the board.

For one, we might have expected the coincidence of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the southern Democratic shift rightward to be the result of their supporting Republican measures in organizing the prosecution of the war. In fact, the divergence of the southern representatives from the Democratic coalition on international relations, while presaged perhaps in the late war period, becomes a clear trend only in the post–World War II years. The trend occurred in domestic policy, where the

outbreak of war was accompanied by clear rightward shift. Roll calls on public works, on wage and price controls, on agriculture, on labor, and on social security saw greater similarity between Republicans and southern Democrats than between Democrats.<sup>44</sup> What is not shown, and which is beyond the scope of this paper, is that by the 1960s, the southern Democratic median on international relations was well to the right of the Republican median. Moreover, this rightward movement occurred first—and ultimately

44. In the days immediately preceding the attack, the South and the GOP had supported the Carl Vinson’s (D-GA) Anti-Strike Bill, which would limit strikes in defense industries, limit the establishment of new closed-shop defense factories, and require industry to take an oath of all persons that they were not Communists or Bund members, and to discharge those who were. Southern opposition to labor unions, which was an important component of their rightward movement, preceded the attacks in December. In the months following Pearl Harbor, southern Democrats allied with Republicans on amending the Employment Stabilization Act (2/19/1942), on the Agricultural Appropriations Bill (6/9/1942), on the sale of grain and wheat (6/26/1942 and 7/15/1942), and on the Emergency Price Control Act (9/23/1942). The next year, southern Democrats and Republicans voted together on a version of the Hobbs Act targeting labor unions (4/9/1943), on a bill regulating wartime use of production plants (6/4/1943), on the Commodity Credit Corporation (11/23/1943), and on a host of other issues falling in the category of domestic politics.




Fig. 7b. Location of Party and Regional Median Members, Tier 1 Issue Areas (continued).

would be more dramatic—for the eleven-state South, although by the 1960s, the Democratic representatives of the six non-Confederate states would be to the right of the Republicans as well (not shown).

The difference in the South’s rightward movement across issue areas helps explain the pattern observed in the aggregate figures, in which the South seemed to move left in 1941 before turning sharply to the right in 1942. In the two years preceding 1941, the bulk of votes had been on the tier 1 category of domestic policy (45%), and especially on the tier 2 category of political economy (13%). In the year surrounding 1941, the plurality of votes were on the tier 1 category of international relations (36%), and especially on the tier 2 category of defense, as the nation began providing for the possibility of war. Southerners strongly supported the administration. What appears to be a move to the left in fact reflects a sharp change in the agenda, one that altered the pattern of conflict.<sup>45</sup> This finding clearly underscores the need for more disaggregated measures.

45. All ideal-point measures share the problem that changes in these can be a product of changes in the agenda or in preferences, and that there is no perfect means of isolating which is responsible for shifts in the estimated scores. This problem, however, is

Relative to the domestic policy and international relations measures, the ideal points estimated on the sovereignty subset of votes exhibit a jumpy quality early on, before settling into a stable pattern during and after World War II. This also is in part a reflection of the content of the agenda, as sovereignty votes in the initial period of the New Deal largely reflected the imperial and expansionist legacy of the preceding decades, while civil rights and civil liberties constituted the bulk of the sovereignty agenda thereafter. Thirty-four percent of the votes in the sovereignty category between 1932 and 1942 concerned the

potentially greater when scores are estimated over short time windows. With longer time horizons, short-term variation in the agenda is likely to be averaged out, although the problem then becomes one of interpreting the meaning of the recovered dimension as the mix and content of issues changes over time. The cost of longer time horizons, however, is that they can result in misleading assessments of political conflict at particular moments and obscure potentially important differences in preferences across issue areas. There is no perfect balance between fine-grained measures more sensitive to subtle changes in the mix of votes and stable measures that potentially obscure the microstructure of the spatial map. Poole, *Spatial Maps*, 185. Researchers should instead be attentive to the particular dangers of each and exercise the appropriate caution in their interpretations.

governing of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the Hawaiian Isles, or American Indian communities; between 1942 and 1952 only 14 percent were concerned with these topics, while votes concerning civil rights had gone from 9 percent to 32 percent, and civil liberties from 11 percent to 48 percent.<sup>46</sup>

But what is most important to note is the dramatic transformation on this issue, largely a function of the increased prominence on the agenda of civil rights for African Americans and civil liberties for various categories of Americans during the war. Civil rights first appears as an issue voted on during this period in the 75th Congress, after having been largely kept off the House agenda since the 67th Congress, when through December and January of 1921–22 the House debated and voted on an anti-lynching bill. When anti-lynching legislation was next considered by the 75th Congress, a sectional rift, already somewhat apparent in 1921–22, had opened up.<sup>47</sup> The South was prepared to stand alone when federal action to secure black rights was concerned, and as we shall see, increasingly stood with the Republican Party when civil liberties were at stake.

What we have observed at the tier 1 categories are different patterns by which the South diverged from the Democratic Party. They broke sharply with their historic role as the left wing of the coalition with the outbreak of war, a trend first evident in domestic policy. Only later did they begin to engage in cross-

party voting on the issue of international relations. And while the full region, as well as the more confined subset analyzed by Key, diverged on domestic policy during wartime, only this more condensed region—where the vast majority of southern blacks also lived—continued on this trajectory for the next several decades.

The tier 2 categories allow us to more closely explore which issues in particular were accompanied by early and/or more complete southern divergence. Figure 8 unpacks the Tier 1 categories international relations and domestic policy, tracing the party and sectional medians for the tier 2 issue areas of defense, geopolitics, agriculture, planning and resources, political economy, and social policy. On defense votes, of which there were relatively few before hostilities began in 1939, there does not seem to be any evidence of a conservative coalition forming. On geopolitics votes, a category that includes foreign aid, the eleven-state South began diverging from the Democratic mainstream in 1943–44, and continued on this trajectory over the next few decades. On this issue—which included votes on the provision of relief to war-devastated countries and the prohibition of funds to countries dominated by the Soviet Union—eleven-state southerners began voting more clearly with the Republicans, and were largely unaccompanied by the Democratic representatives of the broader region.

As with defense, there was no conservative coalition on agricultural policy, and the median preferences of the different factions of the Democratic Party were all relatively similar. In fact, on this issue the northern Democrats tended to be closer to the Republicans than their southern copartisans, and the end of the period saw a distribution of party and sectional medians not unlike that which had opened the period. The distinctive agrarian bent of southern representatives noted by Key worked against an alliance with the Republicans. But in the tier 2 domestic policy categories of planning and resources, political economy, and social policy there was a clear break toward the right before and in the early years of the war, one that occurred to varying degrees and longevity both in the eleven states of the Confederacy and across the full region. The northern and southern Democrats had switched places on political economy by mid-1935, occurring just as the Senate fought over whether to take up the anti-lynching legislation introduced by Democratic senators Edward Costigan (D-CO) and Robert Wagner (D-NY). They would split further in the 75th Congress of 1937–38 and after northern Democratic losses in the elections of 1938.<sup>48</sup> On some issues, these divergences in the

46. It is important to note that this might call into question whether sovereignty constitutes a coherent issue category, or whether the change in the agenda leads to different dimensions being compared. If so, then the ideal points will not be directly comparable. We are less concerned with this possibility, for a few reasons. For one, while it is certainly possible that by aggregating the votes into the tier 1 category of sovereignty we are effectively comparing two noncomparable dimensions rather than identifying changes in members' preferences, this measure allows us to clearly identify when this occurred and, by extension, on which votes and policies. Our confidence in the scores as being truly comparable measures of preferences might be reduced, but the gain will be a much more pinpointed identification of when this dimensional divergence began to occur. Second, both before and after 1942—and before and after the New and Fair Deals—member preferences on the different categories aggregated under sovereignty policy show a consistent relationship. The change that we see is the result primarily of northern Democrats, and to a lesser extent Republicans. The positions of southern Democrats—both substantively and in terms of their estimated positions—remain consistent across this period. This suggests that nonsouthern preference change rather than changed dimensionality—on the set of votes aggregated under sovereignty policy—is responsible for the change that becomes evident around 1942.

47. The likeness scores for liberty votes were initially quite high across the three different factions, at 69, 73, and 72 for southern Democrats/northern Democrats, southern Democrats/GOP, and northern Democrats/GOP, respectively, for the pre-1942 period. After 1942, intra-Democratic similarity declined to 69, while the southern Democrat and Republican similarity score increased to 90. The likeness score between the northern and seventeen-state Democratic Party on civil rights votes was 34, compared with 86 on other votes; the score for northern Democrats and the Republican Party was 61, as compared to 47 on non-civil rights votes.

48. This is supported by the qualitative and historical literature as well, which identifies 1937–38 as the period in which a conservative coalition came into being, with southern Democrats being the most important faction of Democrats to oppose the administration.




Fig. 8a. Location of Party and Regional Median Members, Selected Tier 2 Issue Areas.

Democratic coalition were nearly as much a result of the northern Democrats moving to the left, but for the most part the southern movement was more dramatic and began earlier than that of the nonsouthern Democrats.<sup>49</sup>

James T. Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967); Susan Dunn, *Roosevelt's Purge: How FDR Fought to Change the Democratic Party* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010).

49. The dates at which points these shifts occurred are approximate, as the fifty-roll-call interval can cover successive

congresses. For instance, the northern Democratic and eleven-state South medians on planning and resources cross during an interval centered on July 18, 1939, but included roll calls from June 20, 1936, through June 25, 1942. The average span of time included varies across issue area, from 1.6 congresses in the issue area of political economy to four congresses in agriculture, with an overall average of two congresses. This limits our ability to pinpoint the timing of change, although this limitation is true also for measures such as DW-NOMINATE, which estimate scores across a member's entire career, which are generated for an individual Congress, and which are constrained to move in a straight line between congresses. The advantage of more temporally fine-grained measures is that they have clear bounds, which allows for the content of the agenda to be inspected and




Fig. 8b. Location of Party and Regional Median Members, Selected Tier 2 Issue Areas (continued).

Examining preferences at the tier 3 level is more difficult than for the aggregated tiers, as the relative sparseness of the roll call record requires a starker trade-off with temporal specificity in order to have sufficient votes to discriminate between members. We look more closely at tier 3 preferences in Section III, aggregating across congresses based on the temporal inflections identified here. But we can get a sense of the specific policy debates and legislative

coalitions associated with these changes by examining issue-specific likeness scores for the three main blocs.<sup>50</sup>

Figure 9 traces a set of six-vote moving average likeness scores from the 73rd to the 82nd Congress, with

50. On their own, likeness scores cannot tell us whether southern preferences were changing, although we have evidence that this was occurring for tier 1 and tier 2 issue areas. But they do allow us to identify the specific votes and policy measures on which a conservative coalition began to appear, and thus provide a guide for identifying and more closely exploring the substantive policies and distinctive set of regional concerns underlying this coalition.

compared. And an advantage of GLS is that it maintains the rank ordering of members for each interval.




Fig. 9. Party and Regional Likeness Scores, Selected Tier 3 Issue Areas.

a dotted vertical line marking the attack on Pearl Harbor. Six tier 3 issue areas have been selected in which the voting showed a clear divergence of the South from the Democratic mainstream.<sup>51</sup> The policy areas associated with the tier 1 category of sovereignty showed the clearest sign of southern divergence from the Democratic Party, and the earliest splits in the party occurred in the tier 3 categories of African American civil rights—including voting rights (not shown)—immigration, and liberty.<sup>52</sup> Key had identified southern uneasiness about immigration as a possible source of defection from the Democratic Party, and our data bear out this hunch.

51. We inspected the likeness scores for all tier 3 issue areas, and selected these as showing the greatest divergence from a pattern of greater intrapartisan likeness than cross-partisan likeness. These, we suggest, are the most likely candidates for being issues on which a conservative coalition began to emerge.

52. The similarity between Republicans and southern Democrats on immigration predates the New Deal, and from the 67th to the 72nd Congress the GOP/southern Democratic likeness score was 62, against 72 for the northern Democrats and GOP and 55 for the two wings of the Democratic Party. From the 73rd Congress on, the respective similarity scores would be 82, 60, and 52.

Here a conservative coalition had formed in the early New Deal years.

By 1938, such a coalition was evident on liberty issues as well. Citing Nazi summer camps and Communist organizing in New York City, and the recent painting of Plymouth Rock red, Martin Dies and other southern Democrats successfully urged the House to establish the House Committee on Un-American Activities on May 26, 1938. Over the next several years, southerners and Republicans would unite on a series of votes buttressing the committee.<sup>53</sup> In the area of national resources, which included policies such as enabling and regulating the requisition

53. Maury Maverick, Democrat from Texas and staunch New Dealer, opposed the creation of the committee, arguing that it would “be the greatest fishing expedition that Congress ever undertook in the history of the United States,” and would inflame prejudice and enable “the Republicans on the committee [to] investigate Mr. Roosevelt and the Democrats [to] investigate Mr. Landon, Mr. Browder, Mr. Thomas—everybody who ran against Roosevelt.” Maverick, *Congressional Record*, May 26, 1938, 7576. The painting of Plymouth Rock red (or pink, depending on the source) occurred on May Day 1938. The Communist Party denied involvement. “Plymouth Rock Gets Red Paint Covering,” *Lewiston Daily Sun*, May 9, 1938, 12.

of property for prosecution of the war and later the reconversion of federal programs and property to peacetime, the impact of the war is immediately apparent. Wage and price controls appeared on the congressional agenda in June 1941, and then again more prominently in 1945–46, and were likewise an issue on which a conservative voting coalition was often apparent, although less so than the other issues examined here. Southern Democrats and Republicans joined on economic regulation votes during the war on issues such as affirming the intent of Congress that regulation of the insurance industry should stay under state control.

But it is on the issue of labor markets and unions that the South first and most dramatically diverged on domestic, nonsovereignty, policy. From the wave of “sit-down” strikes in 1936–37, the South had begun voting more and more with Republicans on labor issues. Throughout the 1940s, as Key anticipated, the likeness of southern Democrats and Republicans became dramatically and consistently higher than any other pairing. Southerners and Republicans sought to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act (whose passage had come only after more than a year of bitter fights in and outside of Congress), investigate the National Labor Relations Board, and compel arbitration by the Conciliation and Mediation Boards of labor disputes during the war.<sup>54</sup>

The analysis of roll calls, if anything, understates the importance of southern opposition to New Deal labor legislation. Southern influence upstream in the legislative process was used not only to block further liberal policies but to advance conservative ones, on labor policy as well as on wage and price controls, farm policy, and taxation measures.<sup>55</sup> It was a coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats on the House Rules Committee that refused to report

54. Forty-five percent of southern Democrats (52% of eleven-state representatives) voted, with 89 percent of Republicans and against 15 percent of nonsouthern Democrats in favor of investigating the “sit-down” strikes. While 97 percent of northern Democrats supported the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, only 59 percent of southern Democrats and 43 percent of eleven-state representatives did so, against 48 percent of Republicans who opposed it when it passed the House. Southern support had increased, and Republican support declined, when it came to the conference report.

55. The conservative coalition did more than simply vote with Republicans on the floor. For instance, Schickler and Pearson find that the Rules Committee, during much of the period examined here, provided support for several conservative coalitions that were opposed by the Democratic Party leadership. In addition to holding back liberal legislation—which might have resulted in even more southern opposition in roll call voting—the Rules Committee frequently advanced conservative legislation either that had not been reported by the responsible committee or that was attached to “must-pass” legislation. Many of these in turn did not come up for a roll call or saw conservative priorities advanced on legislation supported by most liberals on account of it being “must-pass.” Eric Schickler and Kathryn Pearson, “Agenda Control, Majority Party Power, and the House Committee on Rules, 1937–1952,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34 (2009): 455–91.

the Fair Labor Standards bill until a discharge petition had secured the needed 218 signatures. And only four days later, on December 17, 1937, 74 percent of southern Democrats and 93 percent of Republicans voted against three-quarters of nonsouthern Democrats to return the bill to the Labor Committee. Southern diversity was also revealed on this issue, at least at this juncture. Senator Hugo Black of Alabama was the sponsor of the bill in the Senate, and had initially proposed that businesses accept a thirty-hour workweek. And, after the bill’s seeming demise in December, momentum was renewed with the primary election victories of Lister Hill and Claude Pepper in Alabama and Florida over two anti-New Deal opponents, with an opinion poll suggesting that a plurality of white southerners supported the bill. After a meeting in the White House, the Southeastern (later Southern, with the admission of Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas) Governors Conference announced their support for the bill.<sup>56</sup> But, for the most part, southern representatives protested the bill as undermining southern industry, because it required wages that could not be reasonably afforded by businesses in the region.<sup>57</sup>

This southern conservatism on issues related to labor standards and organizing—and it was especially on issues relating to unions that the conservative coalition in voting appeared—radiated out to other issues that at first glance did not have an obvious connection. For instance, while Nazism had been central to Dies’s defense of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, he moved quickly to direct the committee’s attentions to the involvement of Communists in government agencies such as the Federal Theater Project and in the growing labor movement. Both contemporaneous and recent histories have shown that the conservative coalition supporting the Dies Committee—both in congressional voting and in committee activities—was organized around a concern with organized labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations in particular.<sup>58</sup>

56. George Brown Tindall, *The Emergence of the New South, 1913–1945* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 602; Howard D. Samuel, “Troubled Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor Standards Act,” *Monthly Labor Review* 123 (2000): 32–37, 36.

57. While a majority of southern representatives accepted the conference committee report (60% versus 96% of nonsouthern Democrats and 52% of Republicans), they had secured a considerable loosening of the standards and coverage of the bill. On passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, see Jonathan Grossman, “Fair Labor Standard Acts of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage,” *Monthly Labor Review* 101 (1978): 22–30, 22. The public opinion poll, reported in Grossman, was published in the *New York Times* on February 16, 1938. According to Grossman, about 90 percent of the jobs lost in the first year of the FLSA’s operation were in southern industries such as bagging, pecan shelling, and tobacco stemming. Grossman, “Fair Labor Standards Act,” 28.

58. Katznelson, *Fear Itself*, 330; August Raymond Ogden, *The Dies Committee: A Study of the Special House Committee for the*

Similarly, a conservative coalition first appeared around the issue of national resources on a bill prohibiting strikes, lockouts, or work stoppages in factories or mines used or operated by the United States for the prosecution of the war. This bill was opposed by nonsouthern Democrats and vetoed by the president, but the veto was overturned by southern Democratic and Republican votes.<sup>59</sup>

The split in the Democratic Party opened up over specific policy proposals, reinforced by successive congressional elections. But the temporal ordering of these divisions was not an accident of the agenda. The differences between the party's regional wings emerged as national policy began to enter into policy domains formerly the prerogative of the states. Perhaps more important, the differences emerged as the positions taken by the swelling contingent of liberal northern Democrats, and the militant labor organizations from which they increasingly drew support, made it clear to the southern political elite that they could no longer rely on their copartisans to support them in their paramount policy concern.

After the elections of 1932, Senator Carter Glass worried that "the victory Tuesday was almost too overwhelming to be safe," and a few years later noted that the "blue eagle [of the National Recovery Administration] was fast becoming a bird of prey," a "black buzzard."<sup>60</sup> The formation of the Southern Tenants Farmers Union in response to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the CIO's decision to send organizers to build unions in southern factories, and the successes of the "sit-down" strikes in the North for union membership drives greatly heightened the anxieties of the southern political leadership, while the reaction against labor unions in national (and especially southern) public opinion encouraged them to break with an otherwise popular administration.<sup>61</sup> The CIO, moreover, was treading on ground that the AFL had long abandoned, supporting biracial unions and explicit organizing appeals to black workers. The first constitutional convention of the CIO in 1938 unanimously endorsed a resolution from a white unionist from Birmingham to work for the abolition of the poll tax, needed to gain the "aid and active support

of the Negro people" and "the only guarantee of the continued existence and progress of the CIO in the South."<sup>62</sup> It was on those issues most implicated in the threat posed by union organizing and federal labor reform—white supremacy and the region's low-wage economy—that southern representatives began to break with their copartisans.<sup>63</sup>

Even a first cut through this descriptive data demonstrates how the substance of policy maps onto the types of coalitions that formed and identifies turning points when coalitional patterns altered with regard to distinctive policies. The analysis also invites us to examine in closer detail which policy areas were most implicated in the maintenance of white supremacy, and the consequences of these issue-specific shifts in southern representatives' preferences on lawmaking and the creation of the postwar policy regime.

### III. THE PIVOTAL SOUTH

A comparison of the 73rd and the 81st congresses, effectively bookmarking the New and Fair Deal period, allows us to look more closely at some of the trends noted above. The first question, one central to Key's project, is the degree to which southern anxiety over the preservation of its racial hierarchy structured attitudes on other issues as well. Key of course identified the Black Belt—those counties where African Americans constituted more than 35 percent of the population—as the bedrock of southern politics. While Key argued that many of the differences between the Black Belt and non-Black Belt were submerged in Congress, it is not unreasonable to expect that ideal points across different issues might nonetheless vary across this divide.

We examine the effect of three different regional groupings on member preferences: the six states of the broader South, the thirty-odd representatives of the Black Belt, and the seventy or so representatives from the non-Black Belt eleven-state South.<sup>64</sup> We limit the analysis to Democrats, and report the conditional marginal effect on a member's ideal point of

62. Philip S. Foner, *Organized Labor & the Black Worker, 1619–1973*. (New York: International Publishers, 1974), 228.

63. Michael Honey, "Industrial Unionism and Racial Justice in Memphis," in *Organized Labor in the Twentieth-Century South*, ed. Robert Zieger (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 138; Sitkoff, *A New Deal for Blacks*, 105; Robert Rodgers Korstad, *Civil Rights Unionism: Tobacco Workers and the Struggle for Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth-Century South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

64. These numbers changed relatively little over time. There were thirty-two representatives from the Black Belt in the 73rd Congress, and thirty-four in the 81st; forty-five Democratic representatives from the six non-Confederate states (none of which met the threshold of more than 35% black) in the 73rd, and thirty-seven by the 81st; and seventy-three and seventy Democratic representatives of the eleven-state South outside the Black Belt in the 73rd and 81st Congresses, respectively.

*Investigation of Un-American Activities, 1938–1943* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1945); Nancy Lynn Lopez, "Allowing Fears to Overwhelm Us: A Re-Examination of the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities" (Ph.D. diss., Rice University, 2002).

59. Roosevelt vetoed the restriction on strikes at war factories, although this was quickly overridden, with 90 percent of southern Democrats and 78 percent of Republicans voting against 65 percent of nonsouthern Democrats.

60. Harvard Sitkoff, *A New Deal For Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue*, vol. 1 of *The Depression Decade* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 103–4.

61. Caughey and Schickler, "Public Opinion, Organized Labor."




Fig. 10. Conditional Marginal Effect of Region on Ideal Point Relative to Mean Northern-Democrat, 73rd Congress.

being from one region rather than another.<sup>65</sup> This is the effect relative to the ideal point of nonsouthern Democrats. We are interested in two differences, that between nonsouthern Democrats and their copartisans across the South's racial geography, and that between southern Democrats in and outside the Black Belt.

Figure 10 shows the marginal effects of different regional specifications on member ideal points for six tier 2 and tier 3 issue areas for the 73rd Congress.<sup>66</sup>

65. The analyses of marginal effects are performed on ideal points estimated across adjacent congresses, in order to allow us to examine tier 3 as well as tier 2 preferences.

66. The marginal effects were calculated from a regression that estimated the effect on a member's issue-specific ideal point associated with being one of four different categories of Democrat: a nonsouthern Democrat (the intercept), a southern Democrat from the six states of the full region, a southern Democrat from outside the Black Belt but inside the eleven states of the former Confederacy, or a southern Democrat from within the Black Belt. There were no Black Belt districts—districts where at least 35 percent of the population was African American—outside the eleven-state South. It is necessary to account for both measurement uncertainty and sampling variability in the ideal points. This problem can be addressed using standard multiple imputation approaches. We sampled twenty iterations from the posterior distribution, ran the analysis on each, and then combined the estimates, taking into account

the within and between imputation variation. The effect was ultimately to slightly increase the confidence intervals. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

67. The poll tax and soldier voting bills saw some southerners from outside the Black Belt support changes to a voting regime that




Fig. 11. Conditional Marginal Effect of Region on Ideal Point Relative to Mean Northern-Democrat, 81st Congress.

The difference among eleven-state southern representatives across the region's racial geography is also significant for labor policy: while almost all representatives from the eleven-state South were further to the right than the mean northern Democrat, this shift was especially pronounced among the representatives of the Black Belt. And across all of these issues except agriculture, where we again note the absence of any

disfranchised many whites along with blacks. The only eleven-state South-representative who might qualify as racially liberal by the tier 2 estimates was Tennessee Republican Dayton Phillips, elected from the first congressional district—held almost continuously by the Republican Party since 1859, and located in the eastern portion of the state where unionism, antislavery, and support for free black voting rights had found support in the antebellum and Civil War eras. He was located one-third standard deviations to left of the chamber median. The most “liberal” eleven-state South-Democrat was North Carolinian Representative Charles Deane, elected to the eighth congressional district, a district whose black community constituted approximately 25 percent of the population. He was located approximately two-thirds to the right of the chamber median, but nearly a full standard deviation away from the South-eleven median. Deane would be defeated in the Democratic primary in 1957 for refusing to sign the Southern Manifesto. He would be honored for this by a Joint Resolution of the General Assembly of North Carolina on July 17, 2003. Resolution 2003–25/House Joint Resolution 231.

conservative tendency among southerners, the consistent effect of being from the eleven-state South and especially from the Black Belt was to push Democratic members toward the Republican Party. Different specifications of the analysis consistently show the same result. At both the beginning and end of the period, there was a clear relationship between representing a Black Belt congressional district and being further right on civil rights and immigration, whether looking at the full region or just the eleven states of the Confederacy. By the end of the period, however, this pattern had extended to labor policy, concerns over which—as we have seen—were implicated in a variety of other issue areas, and the eleven-state South had broken away on a range of domestic policy issues.

A relationship between the Black Belt and conservative policy positions had clearly emerged by the 81st Congress. This occurred just as the South was becoming the pivotal bloc in the House of Representatives, and on those issues where the influence that accompanies their holding the veto location was greatest. One advantage of the Bayesian IRT model used to estimate issue-specific scores is that they allow for a very straightforward identification of the location of the median member of the chamber, as




Fig. 12. Probability of Issue-Specific Median Member Across Region and Party, 73rd Congress.

well as the probability that a given member or a bloc of members will be located in the median position.<sup>68</sup> Figure 12 reports the proportion of times that the median member of the 73rd House of Representatives belonged to different regional and partisan blocs, across different tier 2 and 3 issue areas.

With the massive Democratic majorities of the 73rd House—approximately 73 percent of the seats were held by Democrats, as were 150 of the 152 seats in the South (35% of the chamber)—the South was potentially more important than they had been since the Wilson administration. Still, on most issues, it was northern Democrats who were most likely to be the pivotal bloc in the House. In the issue areas of geopolitics, agriculture, planning and resources, political economy, and labor markets and unions, the probability that the median member would be a non-southern Democrat was 56, 64, 54, 66, and 38 percent, respectively. Only on labor markets and unions did the South pull close to parity.

68. We sampled legislators' ideal points from the joint posterior distribution, ranked the legislators by their ideal point, identified which member was in the pivotal position, and repeated this eight hundred times, reporting the proportion of times that a set of legislators was pivotal. See Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers, "Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data," 360.

At least in the early stages of the New Deal, however, this heightened influence of the northern wing of the party was not particularly threatening, as across a range of issues the different factions had a remarkably similar distribution of preferences. Figure 13 plots the distribution of members' preferences for four tier 2 and tier 3 issue areas, for both the 73rd and 81st Congress.<sup>69</sup> In each, the different segments of the South had broadly similar preferences to nonsouthern Democrats. But in each, this had changed considerably by the 81st Congress, with the South—and especially the representatives of the former Confederacy—moving toward the right.<sup>70</sup>

The 81st was a critical congress for many reasons. Elected in 1948 to follow the Republican congress that had challenged New Deal arrangements, it returned the country to unified government following the surprising victory of Harry Truman on a strong liberal Fair Deal platform. The election campaign had seen the adoption of a civil rights plank at the

69. These are kernel densities, with fifty estimates generated for each subgroup.

70. Separating out the Black Belt shows that these representatives were distributed even further from their nonsouthern copartisans than the non-Black Belt southerners. This was especially true on the tier 2 issue areas of political economy and planning and resources, as well as the tier 3 issue area of labor markets and unions.




Fig. 13. Changed Distribution of Preferences from 73rd to 81st Congress, Selected Tier 2 and 3 Issue Areas.

Democratic Party convention, the Dixiecrat revolt that produced the States Rights presidential ticket led by Strom Thurmond, as well as President Truman's Executive Order desegregating the military and his decision to campaign in Harlem. It also marked a historical moment when, as the section's leading journalist, John Temple Graves observed, "the balance of political power in the 80th and 81st Congress has belonged to the South."<sup>71</sup>

71. John Temple Graves, "Revolution in the South," *The Virginia Quarterly Review* (1950): 190. It also was the subject of one of the first major behavioral studies of Congress, David Truman's *The Congressional Party: A Case Study* (New York: Wiley, 1959). His chapter on "Division and Cohesion: The Structure of Party Voting in the House of Representatives" reported findings of particular interest to our extension of the work of Key. Three findings are perhaps most relevant. He found that most of the time, Democrats voted together, but that for low-cohesion votes "the cleavage was essentially sectional." Truman, *Congressional Party*, 150. But he also found that the southern faction exhibited far more "shifting and unstable alignments," ready to enter into coalition on specific questions with the Republicans. And while the South was especially "multinuclear in form," with "a good deal of fluidity" across issue areas, the non-southern Democrats were by the 81st Congress an ever more united and left-oriented party wing that behaved with considerable independence. Truman, *Congressional Party*, 158–59, 161. Like Key, who along with Robert Dahl and Richard Neustadt is thanked as part of a small group who read and commented on the manuscript, Truman did not have a policy classification with which to work. Issues either appear one by one, as illustrations of the trends in which he was most interested, or are deployed in a very brief treatment of the degree of party cohesion classified by membership in specific substantive House committees.

But the change in southern preferences that had placed the balance of power in the South's hands—the separation of the eleven-state from the seventeen-state South, and the divergence of both from the Democratic mainstream—was not equally important on all issues. This is supported by the patterns in Figure 14, which shows that southerners were now especially likely to be pivotal in matters of political economy and planning and resources, with a clear potential for a conservative coalition on labor. The region's influence over policy, accordingly, seems likely to have varied considerably across issue domains.<sup>72</sup> That southern representatives played an important role in shaping the New Deal and postwar policy regime is perhaps well recognized, but as yet we do not have a strong sense of how this role might have varied—either in the influence they exercised or in the forms of policy they were willing to support—across issue areas.

These results beckon us to follow Key's example of state-by-state analysis, and the close policy-by-policy analysis found in the congressional scholarship of

72. The 81st Congress robustly debated civil rights initiatives, especially an anti-poll tax bill and a controversial effort to create a permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), and extensions to the welfare state. Only one of these, the Housing Act of 1949, became law. But it also produced a number of highly significant enactments concerned with geopolitics, notably the North Atlantic Treaty, the Foreign and Economic Assistance Act of 1950, and the National Security Amendments of 1949.




Fig. 14. Probability of Issue-Specific Median Member Across Region and Party, 73rd Congress.

Richard Bense and Elizabeth Sanders.<sup>73</sup> Following their lead, we are particularly keen to pursue areas marked by unusual policy voting. Overall, we wish to understand better David Truman's finding, noted with regard to the Senate, that "collective dissent from the majority, as distinguished from random individual deviation, was a peculiarly Southern characteristic and one not confined to matters of race."<sup>74</sup>

#### IV. BEYOND *SOUTHERN POLITICS*: THE SOUTH IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

In *Southern Politics*, Key recognized that the hub of the relationship between southern and national politics lies in Congress, at the point where constituency representation and national participation join. And yet neither historians nor political scientists have sufficiently integrated the South into the larger American experience, despite a growing recognition that much in American political development cannot be adequately mapped and explained without a close attention to the influence of southern politics in both state and nation.

73. Richard Franklin Bense, *Sectionalism and American Political Development* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); Richard Franklin Bense, *The Political Economy of American Industrialization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Elizabeth Sanders, *Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877–1917* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

74. Truman, *Congressional Party*, 59.

The recognition of the region's centrality to congressional politics is especially important in light of the turn toward history undertaken by scholars of Congress, as scholars seek to better understand institutional development and better test—with a longer time horizon—models of legislative behavior and output. Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, for instance, have noted the region's importance in understanding polarization and congressional politics, advising scholars to consider the "period from the late New Deal until the mid-1970s" as constituting the "only genuine three-party system in American history," with the southern Democrats constituting an entirely distinct party from the nonsouthern Democrats.<sup>75</sup>

Their admonition to treat the South as a distinctive region in congressional politics for an extended period in the twentieth century is fundamentally correct; but it is also only a beginning, and the broader set of issues upon which the supposedly solid South cohered and broke apart remains poorly understood. This deficiency limits our analyses of polarization over time or of the "end of Southern exceptionalism," and potentially biases empirical models of lawmaking that treat the region's representatives as being arrayed on the same dimension as nonsouthern Democrats and Republican, or that

75. Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Ideology & Congress* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 2011), 54.

treat NOMINATE's second dimension as relevant only on votes pertaining to civil rights.<sup>76</sup> It is crucial to "separate out the South" in historical analyses of Congress; but to do so in a way that is sensitive to changing patterns of southern behavior requires understanding how the substance of representation structured the willingness of southern members of Congress to engage in coalitional politics with their partisan adversaries and copartisans. The divergences we document here—of the South from the Democratic mainstream, and of the different regional groupings within the South—began at different times for different issues, highlighting the importance of a substantive understanding of the particular historical context in which these shifts occurred. But on many issues the South continued to vote with the broader Democratic coalition, and unless variation in southern preferences is taken into account, we risk getting the story wrong or misestimating our models of polarization and lawmaking.

Following Key's insight, this article and the larger project in which it is embedded seek to bring the South from the periphery to the center by emphasizing the region's role in Congress and by exploring the sources of regional unity and fragmentation. Our replication of Key's analyses demonstrates that his findings still hold, under more demanding specification and with more data than he had available. But we also demonstrate the importance of disaggregating across issue areas, raising further questions about the origins, content, and character of member preferences, and especially the role played by the distinctiveness of southern preferences in accounting for legislative behavior and outcomes. Over the course of the period examined here, southern Democratic

representatives began to break with longstanding partisan commitments, and by the 78th Congress they had begun to move away from their long-held position anchoring the pole opposite the Republican Party. But this change did not occur simultaneously across policy areas or equally across the region's racial geography. It occurred earlier and was considerably more marked on some issues than others. Our findings also suggest the importance of another dynamic, one that was by no means distinct from the South's changing preferences: an increasingly cohesive and forceful left-wing nonsouthern Democratic Party. We do not believe these dynamics were unrelated.

Southern members of Congress, flanked by regional apartheid and an increasingly robust national liberalism, were far more intensely concerned with, and united about, the race question than virtually any other actors on the national political scene. Despite an overarching national indifference that set black rights aside or found ways to manage racial tensions during periods of great stress, southern fears that potentially effective external pressure might be brought to bear were not easily allayed. The result was a persistent southern exaggeration of threat, or so we believe to have been the case.<sup>77</sup> "Ironically," David Brion Davis observed about antebellum America, "by continually overreacting to a somewhat neutral, complacent, and racist North, Southern militants created an antislavery North."<sup>78</sup> Likewise, southern fearfulness ultimately made it impossible for Jim Crow and massive southern influence over most spheres of national public policy to persist. But in making that claim, we are moving well beyond the bounds of this article.

76. Byron E. Shafer and Richard Johnston, *The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Postwar South* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

77. Daniel Kryder, *Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State During World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Ira Katznelson, *When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).

78. David Brion Davis, *Challenging the Boundaries of Slavery* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 90.